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UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN INDIANA
OLIVER P. FIELD *
This study is a continuation of one published by the
author in volume one of this journal.' It deals with certain
phases of the operation of the power of the courts to declare
laws unconstitutional. It is concerned not so much with
rules of law as with the functioning of a legal power and
practice. This is not to say that rules of law are ignored,
but it is to say that they are assumed as a background for
the study that follows.
Numerous questions arise as one studies these materials
and only a few of them are answered in this article, but
it is hoped that as the study progresses it will be possible
to answer others. . . How long do statutes stay on the books
before being declared unconstitutional. What remedies does
the bar use in assailing unconstitutional statutes? Do judges
divide on constitutional questions as a matter of course or
do they divide at rare intervals?
I
The historical incidence of judicial review of legislation
in Indiana, as in other states, is interesting when placed
against the background of general state and national history.
Reflected in legislation are many of the issues of each period,
numerous social movements, and almost invariably the signs
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of transition from period to period. These also appear in our
constitutional decisions. Our interest at this point, however,
is in the experience of legislative sessions with the judicial
review of their statutory product.
The first Indiana Constitution stood as an obstacle to
some legislation. Only a few legislative acts were invalidated
between 1816 and 1852, when the second constitution was
adopted. The first invalid statutes involved court procedure,
false emancipation papers (slaves), regulating execution sales,
and extending the period of redemption (no doubt influenced
by the panic of 1837).2 One statute declared unconstitutional
granted a new trial, a reminder of the indistinct lines recog-
nized between legislative and judicial functions in our early
history.
Following the adoption of the present constitution nu-
merous statutes of 1852 and 1853 were declared unconstitu-
tional. This seems attributable to the transition from the
old constitution to the new with the consequent legislative
activity incident thereto. The 1852 statutes declared un-
constitutional related to criminal procedure and law enforce-
ment, three related to courts and their establishment, one
to contracts, two to schools and seminaries of learning, one
to the imposing upon prisoners the costs of trials, one related
to contracts with negroes, and two dealt with highways. The
output of the 1853 session reflected the legislatures interest
in the problems of local government. Some statutes on that
subject and some in the field of decedents' estates and courts
were declared invalid.
Number of Statutes Declared Unconstitutional
Arranged by Enacting Sessions
Session No. of Unconst'l Session No. of Unconst'l
Statutes Statutes
1817 1 1891 9
1821 1 1893 4
1840 1 1895 2
1843 2 1897 1
1844 1 1899 7
1852 14 1901 6
1853 7 1903 7
1855 7 1905 1
1859 3 1907 4
"In an extensive appendix at the end of the article all statutes
declared unconstitutional are set forth, see infra p. 115.
1941J UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN INDIANA
1861 5 1909 3
1865 1 1911 5
1867 3 1913 5
1869 2 1915 5
1871 2 1917 4
1872 2 1919 4
1873 3 1921 3
1875 4 1923 2
1877 1 1925 2
1879 2 192-7 1
1881 11 1929 4
1883 4 1933 1
1885 4 1935 3
1889 12
During the following years a few regulatory laws re-
lating to liquor, and one or two in the field of insurance and
corporations were held invalid. Problems relating to the
creation of governmental offices and fixing duties and sal-
aries, continued to account for a few additional invalid stat-
utes. The session of 1881, however, enacted a substantial
number of statutes which were declared unconstitutional.
Courts, criminal procedure, abandoned animals, taxation and
local government, foreign companies doing sleeping car busi-
ness in the state, mortgage foreclosure, local government and
drainage improvements, were among the subjects involved in
the invalid statutes. During the period from 1889 through
1891 there seemed also to be a number of invalid statutes,
and to some extent they reflect hints of coming groundswells
in politics and economics. The cases involved subjects such
as court affairs, details of governmental organization, es-
tablishment of a geology department, absentee voting, muni-
cipal governments, natural gas conservation, labor blacklist-
ing, agricultural board, legislative apportionment, tax commis-
sion's power to punish for contempt, fireman's pension fund,
and registration of voters.
When one looks at the statutes from later sessions, such
as those of 1911, with courts, constitutional amendments,
railroads, wage payment legislation, and insurance regula-
tion, or that of 1925, with garnishment legislation, and a
fire-arms law as the invalid enactments one comes to feel
that the picture is somewhat different from that which he
probably had in his mind as he approached this problem. The
inevitable impression is, that somehow this does not reveal
the courts acting as arbiters in a never-ending series of
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catastrophic social and economic struggles and playing the
part of great statesmen as well as that of judges. Through-
out there appears a certain amount of distress legislation,
revealing itself under technical titles such as mortgage leg-
islation, foreclosures, and the like. There seems to be an
inevitable litigiousness among us with respect to public of-
fices and local governmental affairs, and we have not forgot-
ten the schools in our contentiousness. Wage payment legis-
lation seems to have troubled legislators more than other labor
legislation enacted during our state history. But most strik-
ing of all is the constant stream of unconstitutional legisla-
tion coming from the private bailiwick of the lawyers that
relates to courts, their organization and procedure. But, in
general, the role of the court in a state like Indiana has not
been that which is generally attributed to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Great economic and social conflicts
have accounted for less unconstitutional legislation than those
more properly called "squabbles."
II
What are the subjects with which unconstitutional stat-
utes in Indiana have dealt? If the invalid statutes are
grouped into the familiar classifications and those subjects
listed which involved five or more statutes the data appears
as follows:
Subject Statutes
Courts 35
Crimes 16
Labor 15
Public Officers 15
Taxation 11
County Government 9
Liquor Control 9
Schools 9
Execution and garnishment 8
Municipal Government 8
Corporations 7
Estates 7
Highways 6
Property 6
Public Funds 6
Contracts 5
Townships 5
In studying this list it is clear that legislation relating to
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courts in general, including the delegation of powers to courts
and withdrawal of power from them, has bulked large in the
unconstitional field. Problems of local government, likewise
have occupied the attention of the legislature and in their
attempts to tread their way through the maze of local gov-
ernment law legislators have at times lost their constitutional
way. In almost every state the experience reveals clearly
that some of our most troublesome constitutional problems
have centered around the problems of public officers, their
offices, and their selection.
Labor legislation, for example, accounts for more cases in
Indiana than in Minnesota, partly because Indiana is more
of an industrial state and partly because Indiana experimented
with various types of labor laws such as laws governing wage
payments at a time when the principles governing such en-
actments were not established on their modern basis.
M
The Constitutional provisions which proved to be the
greatest obstacles to legislation are listed below.
Number
Statutes
Constitutional Provision Held Invalid
Article I, section 1, life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness 6
Article I, section 21, eminent domain and just compensation 9
Article I, section 23, privileges and immunities 12
Article I, section 23, obligations of contract 10
Article III, separation of powers 10
Article IV, section 19, acts to embrace one subject 22
Article IV, section 21, publication of act at full length 15
Article IV, section 22, local or special laws 27
Article IV, section 23, laws must be general and uniform 13
Article VI, section two, county offices 5
Article XII, section 1, judicial power
The figures given above are significant because of what
they reveal as to the bases on which statutes in Indiana have
been declared unconstitutional. The total number of cases
under the bill of rights is substantial, but it must be remem-
bered that the bill of rights contains many particular provi-
sions. The cases are distributed under a number of provi-
sions, such as those on unreasonable searches and seizures,
due process of law, protection to persons accused of crime,
trial by jury, and others. The cases listed in Indiana under
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life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness would in many other
states appear under due process of law. Eminent domain has
given rise to a substantial number of cases, but not nearly
as many as might have been supposed. The cases under priv-
ileges and immunities in a number of other states would also
be classified under the more general due process provisions
found in many of the newer state constitutions which do
not contain any separate provision on privileges and im-
munities.
The group of cases under the obligation of contract is
due in part to the fact that Indiana is one of the older states,
having passed through various phases of the internal im-
provements period. It has also passed through a number
of depressions. Periods of this type are likely to produce
legislation which will run afoul of the obligation of contracts
clause. Some of the cases found in more recent years under
due process are also of the type affecting contract. Some of
the cases which earlier would have been considered under
the obligation of contracts would today be classified under
due process under the influence of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
But the striking thing about the facts reviewed in this
section is that such subjects as the separation of powers and
legislative procedure bulk as large as they do. The former
provision would normally be expected to have barred a num-
ber of statutes because of the legislative attempts to work
out an apportionment of governmental powers so as to en-
able our modern state government to operate with reasonable
efficiency in coping with modern regulatory problems. But
the number of cases found listed under the several constitu-
tional provisions regulating the legislative process itself must
come as a surprise to most of us. In Article IV, sections 19,
21, 22, and 23 are found seventy-eight cases, or approximate-
ly one third of the total cases involved in the study. It must
be remembered that this is a phase of constitutional law that
is highly technical in character, and that in general statutes
declared unconstitutional in this group are declared to be
so not because of defects of substance, but rather because
of defects in legislative procedure. The line between sub-
staitce and procedure is a pretty thin line, to be sure, and
there are some cases definitely related to the subject, such
as special and local laws, but to have such a large number of
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statutes invalidated primarily on grounds of procedure is
worthy of note.
This finding corresponds in general with the experience
in other states, but it should be noted also that the number
of statutes in this group is relatively high in Indiana as con-
trasted with a state like Mfinnesota. This is partially attrib-
utable to the fact that Indiana as a state passed through the
historical experiences such as wildcat banking, lending public
credit to private use, abuse of the power to grant monopolistic
franchises, etc., that gave rise to many of these detailed re-
strictions on legislative procedure, and as a result its public
and its judges were perhaps more sensitive to violations of
these provisions of the constitution. In part it is attributable
to the rapid turnover in the membership in the General As-
sembly of this state. Inexperienced lawmakers are more like-
ly than experienced ones to make this type of mistake. It
doubtless does happen occasionally that mistakes in procedure
are not entirely errors of innocence but certainly in the great
majority of the cases the mistakes were honest mistakes.
There seems to be a tendency for the number of cases in
this class to decrease in more recent years, and this may be
due in part to the presence of an experienced and competent
drafting service established a generation ago as a legislative
service.
It is difficult to ascertain to what an extent technical
details of this type are stumbling blocks for legislation really
regarded as objectionable on other grounds. An analysis
of the subjects involved seems to bring out no marked cor-
relation of any kind. It is well known, of course, that to
invalidate a statute on a technicality of this kind creates a
great psychological hurdle for the proponents of the measure,
and sustained public opinion will usually be required to over-
come this handicap and obtain reenactment.
Some feel that the minute constitutional rules governing
legislative procedure are now outworn, and doubtless this is
true of some of those rules, but it should be remembered
that restrictions such as these still have a sound basis as
applied to the procedures in modern legislative bodies. How-
ever, it should be clear that it becomes increasingly unpardon-
able for legislators, to enact laws in conflict with many of these
rules of procedure, although it is recognized that a few of
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them are unworkable or unnecessary rules under modern con-
ditions.
IV
The number of years elapsing between the enactment
of a statute and the time when it is declared constitutional
or unconstitutional may affect not only the attitude of the
court towards the statute but may affect the equities re-
sulting from holding the statute unconstitutional. In some
instances great injustice may be done by holding a statute
to be invalid many years after it has been enacted and after
private parties and the administration and courts have relied
upon it and conformed their actions to it.
This is a subject that is intimately bound up with pro-
cedure and remedies. The common law system, and the
codes of procedure supplementing it on the procedural side,
is based upon the theory that law is law, and that no distinc-
tion should be made on the procedural side between cases
involving constitutional questions and those involving pri-
vate law questions. This, of course, was a natural develop-
ment in view of the fact that the American courts developed
the field of constitutional litigation with the assistance of
the bar as an incident to ordinary litigation, and developed
it slowly enough so that the public law phases of our legal
system did not attract attention as presenting any different
set of procedural problems from those arising in our private
law.
It is likewise worthy of notice that it is perfectly possible
under applicable procedures to have a constitutional issue
settled in a purely private litigation, without any representa-
tion of the public or the state or government as such. This
occurs in almost every state, and it raises a very serious
question as to the wisdom of permitting private parties to
settle between themselves the presentation of constitutional
issues to the courts. Every lawyer knows the extent to
which courts are dependent for assistance in such matters
upon the full canvass by the attorneys of all phases of the
questions involved. The public's interest may or may not
have a spokesman in such a case.
The average number of years elapsing between enact-
ment and final decision in a group of one hundred and seventy-
two cases in Indiana for which data was available was slightly
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under five years. Fifty cases involved statutes that were
on the books for more than five years. Seventeen statutes
were held invalid after periods ranging from ten to forty-two
years. The figures on this problem are much the same for
a great many states, those for example, from Minnesota cor-
responding very closely, on approximately the same number
of cases.
The data on the time elapsing between the initiation of
the case and the final decision in the court of last instance
is so meager as to permit of no general conclusion. But in
a group of twenty-two cases for which data was available
eight of the cases were in the process of litigation for two
years or more, four stayed in the courts for a period of be-
tween one and two years, and ten were settled within one
year. Here again, the Indiana experience is not out of line
with that of other states.
. These figures raise a question as to whether sufficient
attention has been paid in our thinking about constitutional
litigation to matters of procedure with a view to expediting
the settlement of questions that are essentially public in
nature rather than private in their implications. Five years
is certainly too long a period to wait for the public to learn
whether statutes are valid. Two years is certainly too long
a period for a constitutional question to remain undecided
in the courts.
V
The procedures or forms of action that are most used
in constitutional litigation are important because they cast
light on the problem of adequacy of present procedures and
because they give some additional clues to the parties and
situations involved in such litigation. Listing those actions
used in five or more cases the following data is presented.
Types of Action No. of cases
Action on bond 6
Action to recover real estate 11
Action for damages and penalties 6
Contract 10
Criminal actions 36
Declaratory judgment 6
Debt 7
Injunction 32
Mandamus 20
Quo Warranto 12
Tort damages 23
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Several things stand out as one examines this list. There
are a great many injunction cases, a large number of criminal
actions, a large number of tort cases, and many mandamus
cases. In analyzing the criminal cases it appears that more
Indiana legislation in the traditional field of the bill of rights
has been assailed by defendants than has been true in some
states. A number of invalid statutes affected criminal pro-
cedure, others involved regulatory stautes, such as liquor laws,
food control laws, and wage payment legislation. A few re-
lated to miscellaneous topics such as public works contracts,
firearms, insurance, and illegal voting. It is apparently not
uncommon in Indiana for defense attorneys to make full use
of the contention that the statute authorizing prosecution is
unconstitutional. The experience here revealed can hardly
be expected to discourage the bar on this point. The use of
criminal procedure rather than administrative action in the
field of enforcement is also noticeable.
The quo warranto cases indicate, of course, that a num-
ber of unconstitutional statutes have dealt with problems of
office, the suffrage, and elections. The tort cases are inter-
esting because they indicate that a substantial number of
Indiana cases may have been declared unconstitutional in
actions that were essentially private actions between private
parties. These are to be distinguished from cases of statutory
actions which are likely to be in accordance with a planned
public policy. In breaking down the figures for tort cases
the data reveals that in some instances they reflect the ten-
dency in some fields of legislation to enlist the aid of the
adversely affected parties in cases of violation of the statute
in enforcing the statutory policy. At times this takes the
form of an action for statutory penalties. At other times a
right of action may be created where otherwise it would not
have existed. There are clearly a number of instances where
state acts were declared invalid in private litigation, how-
ever, and this raises serious questions of policy. Should not
the representatives of the state be notified in such cases?
It should be regarded as an encouraging sign that the
relatively new remedy, the declaratory judgment, is already
finding its way into this field. It is admirably adapted for
raising constitutional questions, and if accompanied with a
speedy appeals procedure would improve the administration
of justice.
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The injunction cases are of particular interest because
of their ability to halt law enforcement pending decision.
Under the first state constitution no cases involving uncon-
stitutional statutes were initiated by injunction. In the
decade of the fifties, five cases used the remedy with suc-
cess, but in the three following decades the remedy was little
used. The nineties saw five statutes fall by this remedy,
and the second decade of the present century again witnessed
its use with success on seven occasions. But in the last two
decades it has been utilized less than in the period between
1890 and 1900, on the one hand, and that of 1910 to 1920, on
the other. Clearly, in recent years, the injunction has not
been abused in Indiana constitutional litigation.
The use of the injunction has not been limited to attacks
on economic or social legislation. It has not been applied to
any particular class of cases, nor by any particular class of
litigants. The subjects of statutes involved in the injunction
cases arranged chronologically include: schools, road tax,
change of county seat, schools, laying out roads, railroad aid
bonds, qualifications for absentee voters, restricting exporta-
tion of natural gas, tax on foreign insurance companies,
elections and apportionment, creation of park board, city
boundaries, etc.
If anything is common to most of these cases it probably
is that injunction has been used t6 test the legality of pro-
posed public expenditures in many of them. It has not been
used primarily to test social legislation, although of course,
it has been used to some extent.
VI
About one fourth of the Indiana constitutional cases
involved corporations as parties. The number of cases in
which corporations were parties plaintiff was slightly more
than half the total number of cases in this category. It
cannot be said that in Indiana corporations have been par-
ticularly successful in assailing statutes on the ground that
they were invalid.
It does not appear that any significant relationship ex-
ists between the statutory subjects and corporate participa-
tion in the litigation. There are, of course, a few cases in
which the statutes dealt with corporations as such, but these
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were few in number. In instances in which employer-em-
ployee relations were being legislated upon one might expect
to find a number of corporate parties because corporations
were becoming large employers during the period covered in
this study, but even here corporate' litigation was not dis-
proportionate.
It is to be expected that more cases involving corpora-
tions would be found in the last fifty years than in the prior
fifty years because corporations increased in number during
this period and more statutes regulating corporations were
being enacted. Statutes regulating economic activity in
general were also being enacted in greater numbers and these
affected corporations in common with other business.
VII
Do the judges of the Supreme Court of Indiana often
divide among themselves on constitutional questions? Are
opinions by a bare majority the rare exception?
The questions raised by dissenting opinions are numer-
ous and they have been discussed a great deal in legal liter-
ature. The Anglo-American method of reporting the name
of the judge who writes the opinion as well as of those who
vote for or against the decision naturally emphasizes the
personal views of the judge and thus it is hoped his respon-
sibility will be increased. There has been a feeling in many
quarters that judges vote on constitutional questions differ-
ently from the way they vote on other types of legal issues,
and that they divide much more in this field than in others.
In fact, some even well informed persons seem to think that
unanimity of judicial opinion is relatively rare in the con-
stitutional field.
The Indiana court has a greater number of decisions by
a bare majority than a state like Minnesota, but it is signifi-
cant that these decisions do not generally seem to bear any
relation to the political divisions of the membership of the
court. A complete check of the political affiliations of judges
of the supreme court with cases reveal surprisingly few cases
in which the judges divided along political lines. In fact
they are so rare that they are almost conspicuous. Nor do
they seem to bear any relationship to any special types of
cases, having no correlation with any of the great social or
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economic questions which so often are thought to explain
much of what happens in this branch of the law.3
The cases, however, in which dissents occur are brought
into court within a relatively shorter time after the enact-
ment of the statutes involved than is true in general, and this,
while it does not prove that the issues are any more political
or social or economic than in the other cases, does indicate
sharper differences of opinion. But, as is brought out else-
where, litigants sometimes become more excited about a prob-
lem of local self-government, or lawyers become more heated
about a problem of technical procedure in the courts of law,
than they do in some of the seemingly more fundamental
types of subjects.
The explanations for the number of opinions by a divided
court are perhaps several in number, but none of them seem
particularly conclusive. The learning of the practicing bar,
the tradition of the state in returning sitting judges irrespec-
tive of political affiliation, the methods of selecting candidates
for the bench, the degree of expertness present in the prep-
aration of statutes enacted by the legislative body, the public
attitude towards expertness in the law, and numerous other
factors doubtless interweave to explain the number of bare
majority opinions and divided court opinions in any particular
state and court. The eleven cases with bare majority deci-
sions, and the twelve cases with divided court decisions (vot-
ing four to one) are not particularly significant, although
they do represent slightly higher figures than some of the
other states.
The striking fact that stands out in this phase of the
study is that the great bulk of decisions in this field of the
law are by unanimous opinions. So far as Indiana is con-
cerned the judges have thought surprisingly alike in the field
of unconstitutional legislation. It seems, from a preliminary
survey of a number of other states, that this is a fact that
is common to judicial experience in the states quite generally,
and that some writers have been mistaken in assuming that
judges usually divide upon constitutional issues in the state
courts.
sThe author is indebted to Mr. Wilbur Harrison of the Indiana
bar for aid in this task of checking.
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VIII
To what an extent are the lower courts reliable in their
estimates of what the highest court of the state will do on the
constitutionality of a statute? This question raises an im-
portant problem in the field of procedure, because if lower
courts are usually reliable it might well be argued that re-
strictions should be placed upon the bringing of such decisions
before the highest court. This is not to suggest that the
jurisdiction of the highest court could be closed to this class
of cases, but in some of the states as in the federal system,
the number of constitutional questions presented to the su-
preme court has caused some to ask whether all of the cases
really are meritorious actions.
Limiting the inquiry to those cases in which the trial
court held the statute valid and in which the highest court
held the statutes invalid the Indiana data shows ninety-six
instances in which this occurred. This is almost half the
total number of cases involved in this study, and it indicates
quite conclusively that constitutional cases involve questions
upon which the trial courts are either unwilling or unable to
anticipate the decisions in the highest court of the state. The
reasons for this are not far to seek. In the first place, much
doubt and confusion exists in many fields of constitutional law
so that it would be virtually impossible for the trial courts
to know with any degree of precision what the rules or
principles of law are that will be applied to the particular case.
In the second place, trial courts are local courts, and as such
are likely under a system of popular election of judges to feel
the pressure of local opinion which may favor the validity of
the statutes involved. In the third place, there seems to be
a tendency in many lower courts to assume that a statute
ought not to be declared unconstitutional by the lower courts
unless the statute is so palpably invalid that the conclusion
is inescapable, because the invalidation of a statute is a serious
legal and political action for a court to take.
It should be observed that no particular reflection rests
upon the lower courts of Indiana as a result of these findings.
Instead, the data rather indicates that the lower courts are
performing their function precisely as one would expect them
to perform it.
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